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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. N ature ~f the Case 
Appellants H. Craig and Kristen Van Engelen ("the Van Engelens") appeal the summary 
judgment improperly entered in favor of Washington Federal Savings ("Washington Federal" or 
"the Bank"). The entry of summary judgment in favor of Washington Federal should be 
reversed because there are genuine issues of material fact. In the underlying action, Washington 
Federal sought to enforce a continuing Guarantee, which allegedly made the Van Engelens' 
personally liable for loans entered into by their real estate development company, Van Engelen 
Development, Inc. ("VED"). (R. Vol. I, p. 00008-00012.) The Bank brought a motion for 
summary judgment on its claims. (R. Vol. I, p. 00019-00020.) The Van Engelens opposed this 
motion by asserting that the Bank made multiple misrepresentations in which it stated that the 
loans were not secured by a personal guarantee, and concealed the existence of the continuing 
Guarantee. (R. Vol. I, p. 00398-00416.) 
In particular, the Van Engelens argued that genuine issues of material fact existed 
concerning whether the Bank's affirmative misrepresentations and nondisclosures (1) constituted 
a waiver of the Guarantee; (2) estopped the Bank from enforcing the Guarantee; (3) rendered 
the Guarantee voidable; (4) caused the Guarantee to be unenforceable; (5) discharged the Van 
Engelens; (6) constituted a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing; or (7) 
fraudulently induced the Van Engelens to cause VED to enter the transaction(s). (!d.) The Van 
Engelens also argued that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Guarantee 
was intended to extend to the loan at issue, and whether the Bank had failed to mitigate the 
1 
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claimed or alleged damage. (!d.) The district court improperly rejected these arguments and 
entered summary judgment in favor of Washington Federal. (Tr. p. 45 L. 9 - p. 78 L. 2; R. Vol. 
III, p. 00519-00520.) The Van Engelens appeal, asserting that the entry of summary judgment 
was in error because genuine issues of material fact exist on their defenses. 
B. Statement of the Case, Factual Background, and Course of the Proceedings 
1. Factual Background 
In 2002, VED borrowed $126,000 from Washington Federal ("the 2002 Loans"). (R. 
Vol. I, p. 00327-00328, at p. 64 L. 14 p. 65 L. 16; R. Vol. I, p. 00096, at, 3; R. Vol. I, p. 
00086, at, 3.) In the course of that transaction, the Van Engelens signed a personal continuing 
guarantee (the "Guarantee"). (R. Vol. I, p. 00056-00057.) While the Van Engelens have no 
memory of signing this Guarantee, they do not dispute that they signed it. (R. Vol. II, p. 00369, 
at p. 19 L. 15-25; R. Vol. II, p. 00386, at p. 9 L. 16-23.) The Guarantee was "continuing" 
guarantee by which the Van Engelens allegedly guaranteed any present or future obligation of 
VED to Washington Federal. It states: 
Guarantor guarantees payment to Lender of all Obligations that Borrower owes to 
Lender now or in the future ... Guarantor's Promise extends to all Obligations 
which Borrower owes Lender now or in the future .... Guarantor's Promise shall 
be a continuing guarantee as to any present or future Obligations Borrower owes 
Lender and shall remain effective until Lender actually receives written notice 
from Guarantor that Guarantor withdraws Guarantor's Promise." 
(R. Vol. I, p. 00056.) As the Van Engelens were unaware of this Guarantee, they never gave 
written notice to the Bank revoking it. (R. Vol. II, p. 00369, at p. 20 L. 6-15.) Within one year, 
VED fully paid the $126,000 from the 2002 Loans. (R. Vol. I, p. 00086-00087, at, 5; R. Vol. I, 
p. 00096, at, 5.) For several years following the 2002 Loans, the Van Engelens and their real 
2 
estate development entities (including VED and another entity called Northwest Development, 
LLC (''NwD'') CR. Vol. II, p. 00366, at p. 6 L. 1 16; R. Vol. III, p. 00451, at fj3», declined·to 
do business with Washington Federal. CR. Vol. II, p. 00370-00371, at p. 24 L. 19 -po 25 L. 24.; 
R. Vol. II, p. 00388, atp. 18 L. 24 -po 19 L. 15 andp. 20 L. 13-16.) This decision was based on 
the Van Engelens' feeling that, in the previous transaction, the Bank had breached their trust and 
confidence. CR. Vol. II, p. 00370-00371, at p. 24 L. 19 - p. 25 L. 24.) 
In December 2004, a representative of the Bank: approached the Van Engelens about 
renewing their relationship. (R. Vol. I, p. 00097, at ~ 7.) They were told that the Bank: was 
willing to finance new projects. l (Id.) The Bank did not solicit business from any particular 
entity owned by the Van Engelens, but wanted a relationship with the Van Engelens so that it 
might have access to loaning money to all the entities that the Van Engelens controlled. CR. Vol. 
III, p. 00463, at ~ 4.) Later that month, the Van Engelens learned that a real estate development 
called Carriage Hill No.3 and No.4 was for sale. CR. Vol. I, p. 00097, at,-r 8.) The Van 
Engelenshad conversations with the Bank about financing this project. CR. Vol. III, p. 00463, at 
~ 5.) At that time, they had not determined which of their entities would purchase the project. 
Cld.) They solicited loan proposals from the Bank and two other lending institutions. CR. Vol. II, 
p. 00371, at p. 26 L. 21 - p. 27 L. l.) 
There is disagreement about the content of this meeting, but Bank representatives agree 
that this meeting occurred. CR. Vol. II, p. 66 L. 13 -po 68 L. 25.) 
3 
In February 2005, Bryan Churchill, a loan officer for the Bank, submitted a loan 
proposal. 2 CR. Vol. II, p. 00339, at p. 20 L. 6-9; R. Vol. I, p. 00087, at, 10; R. Vol. I, p. 00097, 
at, 10.) The Bank said that it would require a down payment of20 percent, and a personal 
guarantee signed by the Van Engelens. CR. Vol. I, p. 00087, at, 10; R. Vol. I, p. 00097, at, 10.) 
.A.:round that time, the Van Engelens had a discussion with another developer about personal 
guarantees and decided that, where possible, they would not sign personal guarantees. CR. Vol. 
III, p. 00463,,6.) Mr. Van Engelen therefore told Mr. Churchill that other lenders had submitted 
stronger proposals, CR. Vol. II, p. 00371, at p. 27 L. 22 - p. 28 L. 13,) and explained that they 
would accept a loan from the Bank only if it agreed to not require a personal guarantee. CR. Vol. 
II, p. 00373, at p. 34 L. 23 - p. 35 L. 19.) Because of the Van Enge1ens' previous bad experience 
with the Bank, they were very demanding about the conditions under which they would do future 
business with the Bank. CR. Vol. III, p. 00463, , 6.) The Van Engelens made it very clear to Mr. 
Churchill that they would not cause any of their entities to do business with the Bank if doing so 
required them to personally guaranty any loans. CJd; R. Vol. II, p. 00373, at p. 35 L. 16-19.) Mr. 
Churchill said that he would have to take this and other requested terms to the loan committee. 
(R. Vol. II, p. 00374, at p. 40 L. 2-3.) A few days later Mr. Churchill told Mr. Van Engelen that 
the loan had been approved with these requested terms, including not requiring a personal 
guarantee. CR. Vol. II, p. 00373, p. 36 L. 4-22.) During these discussions, Mr. Churchill never 
2 As Mr. Churchill testified, the Bank chose not to put the loan proposal in writing. CR. 
Vol. II, p. 20 L. 10-14.) 
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mentioned that they had previously signed continuing personal guarantees on behalf of some of 
their entities, including both l\,WD and VED. (R. Vol. II, p. 00369, at p. 20 L. 20 - p. 21 L. 18; 
R. Vol. III, p. 00463, ~ 6.) Instead, he falsely assured the Van Engelens that personal guarantees 
would not be required. (Id.) 
On February 22,2005, the Van Engelens therefore caused NwD to enter into two loan 
agreements with the Bank for the purchase of Carriage Hill No.3 and No.4 ("the Carriage Hill 
No.3 and No.4 Loans"). (R. Vol. I, p. 00097, at ~ 8; R. Vol. III, p. 00423 and 00432.) At 
closing the Van Engelens again sought assurance that a personal guarantee would not be required 
for the Carriage Hill No.3 and No.4 Loans. (R. Vol. II, p. 00372-00373, at p. 32 L. 15 - p. 33 
L. 9 and p. 34 L. 9-14.) A representative of the Bank responded that while the Bank usually 
required people to sign personal guarantees, the Van Engelens would not be required to do so 
because of their long term relationship with the Bank and the longevity of their company. (R. 
Vol. II, p. 00373, at 33 L. 3-9; R. Vol. II, p. 00390, at p. 25 L. 23 - p. 27:8.) 
In order to develop the Carriage Hill project, between January 18,2006, and March 28, 
2007, the Van Engelens caused their other entity, VED, to enter six real estate development and 
construction loans with the Bank in the amount approximately $6 million ("the Six Loans")' (R. 
Vol. I, p. 00046, at ~ 3; R. Vol. III, p. 00464-00465, ~ 9). Each loan was evidenced by a 
promissory note (R. Vol I, p. 00050-55,) and secured by a deed of trust on various parcels of real 
property. (R. Vol. I, p. 00046, at ~ 5.) At the time that the Six Loans were made, the Bank knew 
of the existence of the continuing personal Guarantee that the Van Engelens had signed with 
respect to VED in 2002. (R. Vol. II, p. 00343-00344, at p. 36 L. 23 - p. 37 L. 5). The Van 
5 
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Engelens were unaware of the existence ofthe Guarantee. (R. Vol. I, p. 00086, at ~ 3; R. Vol. I, 
p. 00096, at ~ 3.) Despite the fact that the Van Engelens had previously made it clear to the 
Bank that they would not do business with the Bank if they were required to sign personal 
guarantees, and had received assurances in general and at the time of the Carriage Hill NO.3 and 
No. 4 loans that guarantees would not be required, the Bank never disclosed that these Six Loans 
were subject to this Guarantee. (R. VoL III, p. 00465, ~ 10). The loan documents did not include 
a personal guarantee, or mention or reference the earlier signed Guarantee. (R. VoL II, p. 00342-
00343, at p. 301. 12 - p. 341. 24 and p. 361. 4-22; R. Vol. II, p. 00361, at p. 201. 11-13.) 
Although it would have been Mr. Churchill's custom to remind borrowers that their loan was 
covered by a continuing general guarantee, Mr. Churchill did not give this reminder to the Van 
Engelens. (R. Vol. II, p. 00340, at p. 22 1. 2-20.) Neither did Gloria Henson, who may have 
been present at the closings. (R. Vol. II, p. 00360, at p. 13 1. 18 p. 141. 1.) 
Because the Van Engelens had been previously told that the loans they caused their 
businesses to borrow would not be guaranteed, they believed that the Six Loans were not 
guaranteed. (R. Vol. III, p. 00465, at ~ 10.) Indeed, they caused VED to borrow the money from 
the Bank in reliance on the Bank's previous representations that it would not require personal 
guarantees (Jd.) The Van Engelens had no reason to think the Six Loans were subject to a 
personal guarantee because (1) they had previously communicated to the Bank that one of the 
prerequisites for their business was no personal guarantee; (2) they had confirmed this with 
respect to the Carriage"HIll No.3 and 4 Loans; (3) with respect to the Carriage Hill No.3 and 4 
Loans, the Bank had twice told them that no personal guarantee would apply (which was 
6 
untrue.); and (5) the Bank never mentioned that, contrary to the agreement made in February 
2005, these later loans would be subject to a personal guarantee. CR. Vol. III, p. 00453, ~ 12.) 
2. The Lawsuit and Course of Proceedings 
VED ultimately defaulted on the Six Loans. CR. VoL I, p. 00046, at, 6.) The Bank 
instituted a non-judicial foreclosure sale upon the real property securing the respective loans. CR. 
VoL I, p. 00047, at, 7.) Even after the disposition of the collateral, a deficiency of 
$4,452,809.67 remained. CR. VoL I, p. 00048, at, 10.) The following table summarizes the 
deficiency balances calculated as of the date of the foreclosure sales: 
Loan No. Principal Interest & Foreclosure I Sale Price Balance 
Late Fees Expenses , 
313170-3 214,634.56 10,959.80 2,865.88 214,634.56 13,825.68 
316243-5 2,667,492.73 172,021.63 8,867.54 809,000.00 2,039,381.90 
316250-0 2,695,995.83 216,513.27 9,416.25 568,000.00 2,353,925.35 
329660-5 198,792.76 12,975.38 2,253.46 198,792.21 15,229.39 
329683-7 224,619.76 14,653.86 2,266.36 224,579.76 I 16,960.22 
329690-2 224,325.33 11,303.12 2.154.94 224,296.26 I 13,487.13 
CR. Vol. I, p. 00058.) WillIe the Bank thereafter sold some of the houses on the foreclosed 
property, CR. VoL II, p. 00352, at p. 72 1. 5-23,) the Bank has not constructed additional homes 
on the lots, (R. VoL II, p. 00352-00353, at p. 72 1. 24 - p. 73 1. 3,) and is simply holding the 
property in anticipation of further profits from the sale or development of the property in the 
future. Cld. atp. 761.1-19.) 
On September 9,2009, the Bank filed a lawsuit against the Van Engelens in their 
capacity of personal guarantors for the deficiency of$4,452,809.67 plus interest. CR. VoL I, p. 
00008-00011.) The Bank filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on Apri16, 2010. CR. VoL I, p. 
7 
00019.) The parties both filed initial briefing and affidavits, (R. Vol. I, p. 00021-00058, 00065-
00099.) The Bank vacated the hearing on this Motion so further discovery could be conducted. 
(See R. Vol. I, p. 00003, 00106.) Following this discovery, the parties re-briefed the Motion for 
Summary Judgment (R. Vol. II, p. 00288-307; R. Vol. III, p. 000398-00417,) and filed additional 
evidence. (R. Vol. I, p. 00117 R. Vol. II, p. 00287; all R. Vol. III.) The Motion was scheduled 
for a hearing on October 28,2010, but at that hearing the district court asked for additional 
briefing on a statute of limitations issue and clarification on the facts. (Tr. p. 5 L. 1 - p. 8 L. 25.) 
The parties provided this briefing and additional affidavits. (R. Vol. III, p. 00462-00495.) 
At the summary judgment hearing held on November 12,2010, the district court granted 
summary judgmene in favor of Washington Federal. (Tr. p. 45 L. 9 - p. 78 L. 2.) In particular, 
the district court held: 
(1) That the oral statements and misrepresentations made by the Bank 
concerning the existence of the personal guarantee cannot alter the Bank's 
ability to enforce the terms of the agreement because of the operation of 
the Statute of Frauds, and because no consideration was given for a 
modification. (Tr. p. 52 L. 15-25 andp. 58 L. 16 -po 61 L. 14.) 
3 
(2) That the statements made to the Van Engelens or misconduct by the Bank 
in connection with the Carriage Hill No.3 and 4 loans taken out by NWD 
were irrelevant to the Six Loans at issue in this case taken out by VED. 
(Tr. p. 53 L. 16 - p. 54 L. 1.) 
(3) That the Van Engelens defense of violation of the covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing fails because requiring the Bank to tell the Van Engelens 
The district court stated its rationale entirely on the record of that hearing, and did not 
issue a separate written opinion. 
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about the existence of the guarantee would contradict an express term of 
the guarantee. (Tr. p. 62 L. 24 - p. 77 L. 7.) 
(4) That there is no genuine issue of material fact that the Bank waived any of 
its rights with respect to the Guarantee because the statements made to the 
Van Engelens in connection with the Carriage Hill No.3 and 4 loans taken 
out by 1\JwD were inapplicable to the Six Loans taken out by VED. (Tr. 
p. 67 L. 14-p. 68 L. 11.) 
(5) That there is no genuine issue of material fact that the Bank is estopped 
from claiming the existence of the Guarantee because the Van Engelens 
could have discovered the existence of the Guarantee and because the 
statements in connection with the Carriage Hill No.3 and 4 loans taken 
out by NW'D were inapplicable to the Six Loans taken out by VED. (Ir. 
p. 68 L. 12 - p. 70 L. 12.) 
(6) That there is no genuine issue of material fact on the Van Engelens' 
defense of quasi-estoppel because the statements in connection with the 
Carriage Hill No.3 and 4 loans taken out by NWD were inapplicable to 
the Six Loans taken out by VED. (Tr. p. 71 L. 5-18.) 
(7) That there is no genuine issue of material fact on the Van Engelens' 
defenses of set-off, mitigation, unjust enrichment, and double recovery 
because a guarantor is not entitled to the protections ofIdaho's anti-
deficiently statute. (Tr. p. 72 L. 13 -po 76 L. 4.) 
(8) That there is no genuine issue of material fact on the Van Engelens' 
defenses of misrepresentation and discharge because the Van Engelens 
waived any disclosure of the guarantee and because any matters in 
connection with the Carriage Hill No.3 and 4 loans taken out by NWD 
were inapplicable to the Six Loans taken out by VED. (Ir. p. 76 L. 17 -
p. 77 L. 7.) 
(9) Ihat there is no genuine issue of material fact on the question of whether 
the guarantee was intended to apply to the Six Loans because the language 
of the guarantee extends to all obligations. (Tr. p. 76 L. 5-16.) 
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~ 
(10) There is no genuine issue of material fact on the Van Engelens' defense of 
fraudulent inducement because representations as to future events will not 
support fraud or fraudulent inducement. (Tr. p. 77 L. 8-18l 
The Court therefore entered judgment against the Van Engelens in the sum of$5,036,998.86, 
which included costs and attorney fees. (R. Vol. III, p. 00519-00520.) The Van Engelens 
contend that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to the Bank because genuine 
issues of material fact do exist on their affirmative defenses. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. vVhether the district court erred in holding that no genuine issues of material 
fact existed on the Van Engelens' affirmative defenses, and therefore 
granting summary judgment in favor of the Bank. 
2. VVhether the Van Engelens are entitled to attorney fees on appeal pursuant to 
Idaho Appellate Rules 40 and 41, and Idaho Code § 12-12-(3). 
ARGUMENT 
A. Standard of Review 
When the Supreme Court reviews the granting of a motion for summary judgment, it 
applies the same standard used by the trial court in ruling on the motion. Infanger v. City of 
Salmon, 137 Idaho 45, 46-47, 44 P.3d 1100, 1101-1102 (2002). Because summary judgment is 
an extreme remedy, the Court must construe all disputed facts, and draw all reasonable 
inferences from the record, in favor of the non-moving party, the Van Engelens. Mackay v. Four 
4 The Van Engelens do not appeal the district court's finding that no genuine issue of 
material fact exists on their affirmative defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief can 
be granted, set off, unfair and deceptive trade practices, and unclean hands. 
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Rivers Packing Co., 145 Idaho 408,410,179 P.3d 1064,1066 (2008); Hecla Mining Co. v. Star-
lvlorning Mining Co., 122 Idaho 778, 784, 839 P.2d 1192, 1198 (1992). Summary judgment is 
appropriate only if the evidence in the record and any admissions show that there is no genuine 
issue of any material fact regarding the issues raised in the pleadings and that the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw. Mareci v. Coeur D 'Alene School Dist. No. 271, 150 
Idaho 740, 250 P.3d 791 (2011). A nonmoving defendant has the burden of supporting a 
claimed affirmative defense on a motion for summary judgment. Chandler v. Hayden, 147 Idaho 
765, 771, 215 P.3d 485,491 (2009). In the present case, the Van Engelens have made a showing 
sufficient to establish the existence of genuine issues of material fact on the elements essential to 
establish their affirmative defenses. See, Brewer v. Washington RSA No.8 Ltd. P'ship, 145 
Idaho 735,739, 184 P.3d 860,864 (2008). As such, the district court erred in granting summary 
judgment to the Banlc 
B. Evidence Concerning the Bank's Course of Misconduct Establishes Genuine Issues 
of Material Fact on the Van Engelens' Affirmative Defenses 
Contrary to the district court's ruling, the Van Engelens have demonstrated that genuine 
issues of material fact exist on their affirmative defenses. One key ruling that permeated the 
district court's opinion was the court's determination that any misrepresentations or other 
misconduct by the Bank in the context of the Carriage Hill No.3 and No.4 loans entered into by 
NWD was irrelevant to the Six Loans at issue in this case entered into by VED. In so finding, 
the Court essentially held that all of the misconduct described by the Van Engelens was 
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irrelevant to the case and therefore insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact. In fact, 
this course of misconduct is highly relevant to the Van Engelens' affirmative defenses. 
The Bank's misrepresentations concerning the personal guarantees extended to loans to 
both :NwD and VED. The representations concerning the Carriage Hill No.3 and No. 4 loans 
taken out by NwD are relevant to the course of conduct that led to the Van Engelens' decision to 
cause VED to take out the Six Loans at issue in this case. First, it is important to note that when 
Washington Federal approached Craig Van Engelen in 2004, it approached him to solicit 
business from the Van Engelens, not from any particular entity the Van Engelens o"Wned. CR. 
Vol. I, p. 00097, at 17; R. Vol. III, p. 00463, at 1 4.) The Van Engelens own several entities 
through which they develop real property. CR. Vol. II, p. 00366, at p. 6 L. 5 - p. 12 L. 4; R. Vol. 
III, p. 00462, at 1 3.) NWD and VED are only two of those entities. CJd.) 
The Van Engelens had not done business with the Bank for several years due to a 
previous bad experience, and thus were not eager to do business with the Bank again. CR. Vol. I, 
p. 00097, at 1 6.) Consequently, they were demanding about the terms on which they would do 
business with the Bank in the future. Indeed, they would not do any future business with the 
Bank if doing so required personal guarantees. CR. Vol. III, p. 00463-00464, at 11 6-7; R. Vol. 
II, p. 00373, at p. 34 L. 23 p. 35 L. 19.) In that regard, after a conversation with another 
developer in 2005, Craig Van Engelen determined that he would no longer cause any of his 
businesses to take out loans that were backed by personal guarantees. (R. Vol. II, p. 00374-
00375, at p. at 40 L. 15 p. 41 L. 18.) Craig Van Engelen made this policy clear to the Bank. 
(R. Vol. III, p. 00463-00464, at 11 6-7; R. Vol. II, p. 00373, at p. 34 L. 23 - p. 35 L. 19.) 
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In early 2005, the Van Engelens began developing the Carriage Hill project. (R. Vol. I, 
p. 00097, at 18.) At the time that Craig Van Engelen first discussed the project with Brian 
Churchill from the Bank, the Van Engelens had not decided which of their various entities would 
develop the project. (R. Vol. III, p. 00463, at 1 5.) However, in those initial conversations it was 
discussed that the loans for the project would not be guaranteed. (Id. at 1'5-7; R. Vol. I, p. 
00097, at 11 10-12.) It was not until later that it was decided that the first two loans for the 
project would be taken out by NwD. (R. Vol. III, p. 00463, at 1 5.) As it turned out, NWD and 
VED were both used in the development of the Carriage Hill project and both borrowed money 
from the Bank for the project. (Jd.) 
Thus, the relationship the Bank was seeking when it made its representations was a 
relationship with the Van Engelens, not any particular entity owned by the Van Engelens. Craig 
Van Engelen told Mr. Churchill that for the Bank to get the Van Engelens' business, the Bank 
would have to agree to loans without personal guaranties from the Van Engelens. (R. Vol. II, p. 
00373, at p. 34 L. 23 - p. 35 L. 19; R. Vol. III, p. 00463, at 11 5-7.) Churchill responded by 
assuring the Van Engelens that personal guarantees would not be required for future loans from 
the Bank. (R. Vol. III, p. 00463, at 1 6; R. Vol. II, p. 00373, at p. 34 L. 4 - p. 36 L. 11.) The 
representation was reaffirmed during the closings for the 2005 loans to NWD. (R. Vol. III, p. 
00464, at, 8.) In fact, Gloria Henson from the Bank specifically told the Van Engelens that no 
guaranties were required because the Van Engelens had done business with the Bank for so 
many years with a successful track record. (R. Vol. II, p. 00372-00373, at p. 32 L. 20 - p. 33 L. 
9.) In fact, these statements were untrue, as a continuing personal guarantee existed for loans 
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taken out byl'iwD. (R. VoL II, p. 00369, at p. 20 L. 20 - p. 21 L. 18; R. Vol. III p. 00463, ~ 6.) 
Had that continuing guarantee been disclosed, the Van Engelens would have known to inquire 
about whether continuing guarantees existed for any of their other entities. 
The Van Engelens subsequently caused VED to take out the loans for the further 
development of the Carriage Hill project. (R. Vol. III, p. 00464, at ~ 9.) Those loans are the 
loans at issue in this lawsuit. (Id.) The Van Engelens cannot recall why they switched to VED 
from NWD for the at-issue loans. (R. Vol. II, p. 00376, atp. 47 L. 8-21; R. Vol. III, p. 00464, at 
~ 9.) However, to them it was immaterial which entity took out the loans, because of their stated 
policy to the Bank that they would not take out any loans on behalf of any of their entities if they 
had to personally guarantee those loans. (R. Vol. III, p. 00464, at ~ 7.) After falsely affirming 
that the loans were not guaranteed during the closing of the NWD loans, the Bank failed to 
inform the Van Engelens of its new position that the subsequent loans to VED for the same 
project would be personally guaranteed. (Id. at ~~ 9-10.) 
As with the NwD loans, the Bank never disclosed to the Van Engelens during 
negotiations or closing for the at-issue loans to VED that the loans would be personally 
guaranteed. (Id.). At no time during the negotiations and closings for any of the loans taken out 
by entities owned by the Van Engelens after those initial conversations in late 2004/early 2005, 
did anyone from the Bank inform them that they had already signed guarantees and that those 
guarantees would apply to the new loans taken out by their entities between 2005 and 2007. (R. 
Vol. III, p. 00463-00464, at ~~ 6-11; R. Vol. I, p. 00097-00098, at ~~ 11-20; R. Vol. II, p. 00369, 
at p. 18 L. 23 - p. 19 L. 3; R. Vol. II, p. 00369-00370, at p. 20 L. 20 - p. 21 L. 10; R. Vol. II, p. 
14 
00370, at p. 21 L. 20 p. 22 L. 19; R. Vol. II, p. 00375, at p. 42 4-14.) Because they had 
previously been told that the loans they caused their businesses to borrow would not be 
guaranteed, they had no reason to believe that the loans at issue in this lawsuit were subject to a 
continuing guarantee. (fd.) Indeed, they caused VED to borrow money from the Bank in 
reliance on the Bank's previous representations that the loans would not be guaranteed. CJd.) 
Thus, the representations concerning the ~WD loans are relevant. It was not until later in 
the negotiations that it was decided that the first two loans for the project would be taken out by 
:NwD. In fact, Craig Van Engelen did not remember that the first two loans were taken out by 
J\rvvTI instead ofVED until he reviewed the documents produced by the Bank after he filed his 
first affidavit; he originally remembered that all of the loans related to the Carriage Hill project 
were taken out by VED. CR. Vol. III, p. 00464, at, 8.) Accordingly, this case is not about which 
of the two entities owned by the Van Engelens took out the loans because continuing guarantees 
had been signed as to both entities. Instead it is about the personal guarantees signed by the Van 
Engelens and the Bank's course of conduct with respect to those guarantees. Indeed, the Bank's 
conduct and representations that the first two loans were not guaranteed, coupled with the Bank's 
failure to disclose its position that the subsequent loans would be guaranteed, deceitfully led the 
Van Engelens to believe that the subsequent loans taken out by VED for the same project also 
were not guaranteed. 
Because of the Van Engelens'position that they would not guarantee any loans during 
negotiations for the 2005 loans to NWD, the Bank knew that the Van Engelens were under the 
misimpression that any future loans taken out by their companies were not subject to personal 
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guarantee. Under those circumstances, the Bank had a duty to correct this misimpression. Rest. 
2d Torts § 551. The Bank, however, did not disclose the subsequent loans to VED were 
personally guaranteed by the Van Engelens. Thus, the misrepresentations made with respect to 
the 2005 loans to NwD create issues of fact as to whether personal guarantee can be enforced 
with respect to the 2006 and 2007 loans to VED. Contrary to the district court's holding, 
genuine issues of material fact exist on the Van Engelens' affirmative defenses. As such, the 
district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the Bank:. 
1. Genuine Issues of Material Fact Exist on the Van Engelen' Defense of 
Waiver 
The Van Engelens asserted the affirmative defense that the Bank waived the Guarantee. 
Waiver is a voluntary, intentional relinquishment of a known right or advantage. Margaret H. 
Wayne Trust, 123 Idaho at 256,846 P.2d at 907. Waiver ofa contract provision is shown when 
the intention to waive is clearly present and the party asserting the waiver shows that he acted in 
reasonable reliance upon it and that he thereby has altered his position to his detriment. Magic 
Valley Foods, Inc. v. Sun Valley Potatoes, Inc., 134 Idaho 785, 788, 10 P.3d 734, 737 (2000). 
Waiver may be inferred from a clear and unequivocal act manifesting an intent to waive, or from 
conduct amounting to estoppel. .Margaret H. Wayne Trust, 123 Idaho at 256,846 P.2d at 907. 
Contrary to the district court's finding otherwise, (Tr. p. 67 L. 14 - p. 68 L. 11,) the 
Bank's course of conduct demonstrates that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether 
the Bank: waived the personal guarantee. As noted above, when the Bank approached the Van 
Engelens about reestablishing their relationship, the Van Engelens made it clear to the Bank that 
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they would not do any future business with the Bank if doing so required personal guarantees. 
CR. Vol. III, p. 00463-00464, at 'If'lf 6-7; R. Vol. II, p. 00373, at p. 34 L. 23 - p. 35 L. 19.) In fact, 
Craig Van Engelen told Brian Churchill that for the Bank to get the Van Engel ens ' business it 
would need to make the loan to the Van Engelen businesses without personal guaranties from the 
Van Engelens. CR. Vol. II, p. 00373, at p. 34 L. 23 - p. 35 L. 19; R. Vol. III, p. 00463-00464, at 
-,r,5-7.) Churchill responded by assuring the Van Engelens that personal guarantees would not 
be required for future loans from the Bank. CR. Vol. III, p. 00463, at,; 6; R. Vol. II, p. 00373, at 
p. 34 L. 4 - p. 36 L. 11.) With respect to the first two loans taken out by :NWD for use on the 
Carriage Hill project, two Bank representatives affirmatively stated that no personal guarantee 
would be required for these loans, despite the existence of a continuing guarantee for loans taken 
out by NWD. CR. Vol. II, p. 00373, p. 33 L. 3-9; R. Vol. II, p. 00390, at p. 25 L. 23 - p. 27:8; R. 
Vol. II, p. 00373, p. 36 L. 4-22.; R. Vol. III p. 00463, , 6; R. Vol. II, p. 00369, at p. 20 L. 20 - p. 
21 L. 18.) These circumstances show a clear and unequivocal act manifesting the intent to 
waive, as well as conduct amounting to estoppel 
Relying upon the Bank's previous representations that the loans would not require 
guarantees, the Van Engelens caused VED to take out the loans for the further development of 
the Carriage Hill project, which are the loans at issue in this lawsuit. CR. Vol. III, p. 00463-
00464, at 'If 6-11; R. Vol. I, p. 00097-00098, at 'If' 11-20; R. Vol. II, p. 00369, at p. 18 L. 23 - p. 
19 L. 3; R. Vol. II, p. 00369-00370, at p. 20 L. 20 - p. 21 L. 10; R. Vol. II, p. 00370, at p. 21 L. 
20 - p. 22 L. 19; R. Vol. II, p. 00375, at p. 42 L. 4-14.) As with the NWD loans, the Bank never 
disclosed to the Van Engelens during any negotiations for the at-issue loans to VED and the 
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closings of those loans that the loans would be personally guaranteed. CR. Vol. III, p. 00464, at, 
9-10.) The loan documents themselves did not reference any personal guarantee. CR. Vol. II, p. 
00340, at p. 23 L. 11-14.) Because of the Van Engelens' position that they would not guarantee 
any loans during negotiations for the 2005 loans to :NvVD, the Bank knew that the Van Engelens 
were under the misimpression that any future loans taken out by their companies were not 
subject to personal guarantee. Under those circumstances, the Bank had a duty to correct this 
misimpression. Rest. 2d Torts § 551. The Bank, however, did not disclose the subsequent loans 
to VED were personally guaranteed by the Van Engelens. In short, Van Engelens altered their 
position to their detriment because these assurances induced them to cause their company to 
enter into the loan agreements with the Bank without first revoking the continuing Guarantee. 
CR. Vol. III, p. 00465, at " 10-11.) Because the Bank evidenced an intention to waive the 
Guarantee and the Van Engelens reasonably relied upon that waiver and altered their position to 
their detriment, the Bank's Motion for Summary Judgment should have been denied. 
2. Genuine Issues of Material Fact Exist on the Van Engelens' Defense of 
Equitable Estoppel 
The Van Engelens contend that the Bank should be equitably estopped from enforcing 
the Guarantee. Estoppel is a bar by which a party is precluded from denying a fact of 
consequence because his own previous actions have led another party to conduct himself in such 
a way that the other party would suffer. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. v. Lee, 95 Idaho 134, 135-
36,504 P.2d 807, 808-809 (1972). It is based on the concept that it would be inequitable to 
allow a person to induce reliance by taking a certain position and, thereafter, take an inconsistent 
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position when it becomes advantageous to do so. Regjovich v. First Western Investments, Inc., 
134 Idaho 154,158,997 P.2d 615, 619 (2000). The elements of equitable estoppel are (1) a false 
representation or concealment of a material fact with actual or constructive knowledge ofthe 
truth; (2) that the party asserting estoppel did not know or could not discover the truth; (3) that 
the false representation or concealment was made with the intent that it be relied upon; and (4) 
that the person to whom the representation was made, or from whom the facts were concealed, 
relied and acted upon the representation or concealment to his prejudice. Terrazas v. Blaine 
County ex reI. Bd. aICom'rs, 147 Idaho 193,200 n. 2, 207 P.3d 169, 176 n. 2 (2009). Because it 
concealed the existence of the Guarantee and did not correct its misleading assertions that no 
personal guarantee would be required for the Van Engelens' business with the Bank, the Bank is 
estopped from enforcing the Guarantee. 
The Bank's false representations and concealments are described in detail above. Of 
particular note, the Bank knew that the Van Engelens would not do any future business with the 
Bank through any of their entities if they were required to personally guarantee any loans. (R. 
Vol. III, p. 00463-00464, at ~~ 6-10.) The Bank assured them that they would not be required to 
guarantee any loans. (Id.) While making this representation, the Bank did not disclose that the 
guarantees the Van Engelens had signed earlier on behalf of some of their entities, including 
NWD and VED, were continuing and would by their terms apply to the new loans taken out by 
the Van Engelens on behalf of both NWD and VED. (Id.) The Bank, which admittedly knew 
otherwise, (R. Vol. II, p. 00343-00344, at p. 36 L. 23 - p. 37 L. 5,) continued to conceal the 
existence of the guarantees in order to induce the Van Engelens to take out further loans with the 
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Bank. The Van Engelens actually relied on the Bank's misstatements and concealments by 
causing VED to enter into the loan agreements with the Bank for the at-issue loans. (R. Vol. II, 
p. 00371, at p. 27 1. 22 - p. 28 1. 16; R. Vol. III, p. 00465, at ~, 10-11.) The circumstances 
show that these false representations and concealment were made with the intent that the Van 
Engelens rely on these misrepresentations and nondisclosure to cause their businesses to borrow 
money from the Bank. 
Furthermore, contrary to the district court's holding otherwise, the Van Engelens could 
not readily discover the truth. Idaho law provides that that one may not assert estoppel based 
upon another's misrepresentation if the one claiming estoppel had readily accessible means to 
discover the truth. Regjovich, 134 Idaho at 158, 997 P.2d at 619. If one either knew or had the 
ability with reasonable diligence to determine the truth, the second element of equitable estoppel 
is lacking. Id. The Van Engelens testified that they didn't remember signing the Guarantee and 
never received a copy of the Guarantee. (R. Vol. I, p. 00086, at 13; R. Vol. I, p. 00096, at 1 3.) 
As the Bank admitted, the Guarantee, which was signed approximately four years before, was 
not even referenced in the loan documents. (R. Vol. II, p. 00342-00343, at p. 301. 12 - p. 341. 
14 and p. 361. 4-22.) 
This is similar to the circumstances in Lewis v. Continental Life and Accident Co., 93 
Idaho 348, 461 P .2d 243 (1969). In that case, a county purchased a group life insurance plan 
covering county employees, relying upon a representation that the policy would cover all county 
employees who had been covered under the county's prior insurance plan. The master policy 
was kept in the county clerk's vault. A handbook that explained the benefits in simple language 
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was supplied by the insurer and distributed to employees. \\'hen the widow of an employee made 
a claim for benefits, the insurer denied coverage based upon provisions in the master policy that 
were not mentioned in the handbook and that contradicted the representations made to the 
county. In that case, the employee reasonably relied upon the insurance agents' representations 
and the description of coverage provided in the employee handbook because there was no 
opportunity to learn of additional terms contained only in the master policy held in the county's 
vault. See, e.g., Tiffany v. City of Payette, 121 Idaho 396, 403,825 P.2d 493,500 (1992) (party 
claiming estoppel must show "lack of knowledge and of the means of knowledge of the truth as 
to the facts in question"); Alder v. Mountain States Tel. & Telegraph Co., 92 Idaho 506, 511,446 
P.2d 628, 633 (1968) (a party claiming estoppel must be "excusably ignorant of the true facts"). 
Similarly, the Van Engelens did not have access to the means by which to learn of the Guarantee, 
which was in the possession of the Bank and which they had never received a copy of, and thus 
were excusably ignorant of the true facts. 
The reasonableness of the Van Engelens' reliance is further underscored by the Bank's 
conduct. In light of the Bank's affirmative misrepresentations that no guarantee would be 
required for loans taken out by the Van Engelens and their entities and the Bank's failure to 
disclose the existence of the guarantees at any of the loan documents or closings, the Van 
Engelens could not reasonably have discovered that these new loans to NWD and VED were 
covered by prior guarantees that they did not remember signing. In fact, even if the Van 
Engelens had remembered their continuing guarantee, they had no reason to believe this 
Guarantee applied to the any loans taken out by the Van Engelens after 2005 because the Bank 
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affirmatively told them no guarantee would be required. As genuine issues of material fact exist 
on the Van Engelens' defense of equitable estoppel, the district court erred in granting summary 
judgment in favor of the Bank. 
3. Genuine Issues of Material Fact Exist on the Van Engelens' Defense of Quasi 
Estoppel 
The Van Engelens assert that the Bank should be estopped from taking a new position 
that the Guarantee secures the loans. The doctrine of quasi-estoppel prevents a party from taking 
a position inconsistent with an earlier position, to the detriment of the person seeking application 
of the doctrine. City of Eagle v. Idaho Dept. afWater Res., 247 P.3d 1037,1042 (2011). 
Therefore, the doctrine of quasi-estoppel applies when: (1) the offending party took a different 
position than his or her original position; and (2) either (a) the offending party gained an 
advantage or caused a disadvantage to the other party; (b) the other party was induced to change 
positions; or (c) it would be unconscionable to permit the offending party to maintain an 
inconsistent position from one he or she has already derived a benefit or acquiesced in. 
Terrazas, 147 Idaho at 200 n. 3,207 P.3d at 176 n. 3. "Quasi estoppel is distinguished from 
equitable estoppel 'in that no concealment or misrepresentation of existing facts on the one side, 
no ignorance or reliance on the other, is a necessary ingredient. '" Willig v. State, Dept. of Health 
& Welfare, 127 Idaho 259, 261,899 P.2d 969,971 (1995) citing Evans v. Idaho State Tax 
Comm., 97 Idaho 148, 150,540 P.2d 810,812 (1975). Rather, "[tJhe doctrine of quasi estoppel 
applies when it would be unconscionable to allow a party to assert a right which is inconsistent 
with a prior position." Willig, 127 Idaho at 261,899 P.2d at 971. 
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In tbis case, the district court rejected the doctrine only because it held that the Bank's 
misconduct was irrelevant to the Six Loans. The error of this position is described in detail 
above. The Bank's present position that the continuing Guarantee applies to the Six Loans is 
contrary to its other stated positions, when it solicited the business of the Van Engelens, that 
personal guarantees would not be required. (R. Vol II, p. 00372-00373, at p. 31 L. 24 - p. 33 L. 
9; R. Vol. II, p. 00399, at p. 24 L. 23-27 and p. 28 L. 14-23; R. Vol. III, p. 00463-00466, at ~~ 6-
12.) This original position was a key factor in the Van Engelens' decision to cause their 
company to enter into the Six Loans, (R. Vol. III, p. 00463-00465, at ~~ 6-11,) thereby giving a 
significant advantage and benefit to the Bank. The Bank gained an advantage because it induced 
the Van Engelens to cause their business to enter loans with the Bank after the Van Engelens had 
determined not to do business with the Bank if a guarantee was required. (R. Vol. II, p. 00373, at 
p. 34 L. 23 - p. 35 L. 19; R. Vol. III, p. 00463, at ~ 6.) It would be unconscionable to now 
permit the Bank to change its position concerning the applicability of the Guarantee to loans 
taken out by the Van Engelens after it maintained its original position in order to induce the Van 
Engelens to cause their company to enter into these loans. Under these circumstances, the 
district court erred in finding that there was no genuine issue of material fact with respect to the 
affirmative defense of quasi estoppel. 
4. Genuine Issues of Material Fact Exist on the Van Engelens' Defense of Good 
Faith and Fair Dealing 
The Van Engelens assert that the Bank violated the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing. The covenant of good faith and fair dealing is an obligation implied in every contract. 
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See Idaho First Nat. Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc., 121 Idaho 266,287,824 P.2d 841,862 
(1991) (discussing the doctrine in the context of guarantees); In re Target Indus., Inc., 328 B.R. 
99, 121 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2005) ("Lenders are bound by an implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing by virtue of their contractual relationship with a guarantor"). As the Idaho Supreme 
Court has said: 
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing requires "that the parties perform in 
good faith the obligations imposed by their agreement," Badgett v. Security State 
Bank, 116 Wash.2d 563, 807 P.2d 356, 356 (1991), and a violation of the 
covenant occurs only when "either party ... violates, nullifies or significantly 
impairs any benefit of the ... contract. ... " Sorensen v. Comm Tek, Inc., 118 Idaho 
664,669, 799 P.2d 70, 75 (1990); Metcalfv. Intermountain Gas Co., 116 Idaho 
622,778 P.2d 744 (1989). 
Bliss Valley Foods, Inc., 121 Idaho at 287,824 P.2d at 862. 
The Bank breached this duty when it concealed the existence of the Guarantee and did 
not correct its misleading assertion that no guarantee would be required for the Van Engelens' 
transactions with the Bank, particularly when they knew that the Van Engelens were under a 
misapprehension about the existence and applicability of the guarantee. A party to a business 
transaction has a duty to disclose "matters known to him that he knows to be necessary to 
prevent his partial or ambiguous statement of the facts from being misleading;" and "facts basic 
to the transaction, ifhe knows that the other is about to enter into it under a mistake as to them, 
and that the other, because of the relationship between them, the customs of the trade or other 
objective circumstances, would reasonably expect a disclosure of those facts." Rest. 2d Torts § 
551(2)(b), (c), and (e). See Rest. 2d Torts § 551(1) ("One who fails to disclose to another a fact 
that he knows may justifiably induce the other to act or refrain from acting in a business 
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transaction is subject to the same liability to the other as though he had represented the 
nonexistence of the matter that he has failed to disclose.") 
Under the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, banks are obligated to inform even 
continuing guarantors of new liability when the bank has reason to believe that the guarantor is 
unaware of this new liability. An illustrative case is Lacrosse State Bank v. Estate ojlvfcLoone, 
359 N.W.2d 179, 1984 WL 180170 (\Vis. App. 1984) (unpublished). In that case, a bank sought 
to enforce a continuing guarantee against an individual who previously had an interest in the 
borrower company, but who the bacl'lk knew no longer had an interest at the time of the new loan. 
The court noted that: 
Although the bank had no obligation to give any notice to [guarantor of his 
potential new liability] under the broad language of [guarantor's] continuing 
guaranty, a guaranty is a contract and, as with any contract, a party seeking 
enforcement must have acted in good faith .... the bank knew or should have 
known that [guarantor] had no reason to guarantee new . . . loans. With this 
knowledge, fairness dictated that the bank at least give [guarantor] some notice or 
warning if it expected to hold him liable for new ... loans. 
Id. at *1. 
Such is the case here. The Bank acted in bad faith by not disclosing the existence of the 
guarantees when it made the at-issue Six Loans to Van Engelen Development in 2006 and 2007. 
This is especially true after learning of the Van Engelens' position during the negotiations for the 
2005 loans to NWD that they would not personally guarantee any loans from the Bank. The 
Bank had ample evidence that the Van Engelens were unaware of the Guarantee. In fact, the 
Bank itself fostered the Van Engelens' misunderstanding. In 2005, the Bank falsely assured the 
Van Engelens that no personal guarantee applied to the Carriage Hill No.3 and No.4 Loans. It 
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is a breach of the covenant to tell the Van Engelens that no guarantee applied to those loans, and 
then not inform the Van Engelens that a prior Guarantee would apply to the subsequent Six 
Loans taken out VED in 2006 and 2007. The Bank's misrepresentations and silence violates and 
significantly impairs the contract, because it prevented the Van Engelens from the opportunity to 
exercise their contractual right to terminate the continuing Guarantee prior to causing VED to 
enter into the loan agreement. (R. VoL I, p. 00087, at ~ 19; R. VoL I, p. 00097, at ~ 20.) As the 
Bank has violated its own duties of good fait."'1 and fair dealing, it cannot now enforce the 
Guarantee against the Van Engelens. 
The district court held that this defense failed because requiring the Bank to tell the Van 
Engelens about the existence of the guarantee would contradict an express term of the Guarantee 
contained in an "express waiver of [the Bank's] requirement to disclose." (Tr. p. 62 L. 24 - p. 77 
L. 7.) The district court correctly noted that express terms of a contract may not be overridden 
by those implied from the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, Huyett v. Idaho State 
University, 140 Idaho 904, 910, 104 P.3d 946,952 (2004). However, requiring that Bank to 
disclose the existence of the Guarantee, under circumstances where it knew that the Van 
Engelens were under a misapprehension about its existence, does not override any express term 
contained in the Guarantee. The Van Engelens did waive notice of certain matters, as contained 
in Section 6 and 7 of the Guarantee. In particular, the Van Engelens waived the right to be 
informed about the Bank's extension ofthe repayment or renewal of the borrower's obligations; 
ceasing to extend credit to the borrower; changes in the agreement with the borrower; release of 
the borrower; release of collateral; application of collateral; acceptance of the guarantee; 
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extension of other credit to the borrower; or the failure of the borrower to pay. (R. Vol. I, p. 
00056.) Nowhere in that agreement is an express waiver of disclosure of the existence of the 
Guarantee. Therefore, contrary to the district court's holding otherwise, the requirement of 
disclosure under the circumstances imposed by the covenant of good faith and fair dealing does 
not contradict an express provision of the contract. As such, particularly where the Bank was 
aware of and had actively fostered the Van Engelens' misapprehension that no guarantee would 
apply, the Bank's failure to disclose the existence of the Guarantee violates the covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing. As genuine issues of material fact exist with respect to this affirmative 
defense, the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the Bank. 
5. Genuine Issues of Material Fact Exist on the Van Engelens' Affirmative 
Defenses of Fraud/MisrepresentationlDischarge 
The Van Engelens assert that the Bank's failure to disclose the existence of the 
continuing Guarantee and failure to correct the Bank's misrepresentations that no guarantee 
would be required renders the Guarantee voidable, unenforceable, and discharges the Van 
Engelens. See Marine Bank, Nat. Ass 'n v. Meat Counter, Inc., 826 F.2d 1577 (7th eir. 1987) (a 
question of fact existed on whether a guarantee was voidable due to misrepresentation). Indeed, 
"[i]fthe secondary obligor's assent to the secondary obligation is induced by fraudulent or 
material misrepresentation by the obligee upon which the secondary obligor is justified in 
relying, the secondary obligation is voidable by the secondary obligor." Rest. 3d Sur, § 12(1). 
Notably, "a misrepresentation occurring after the execution of a continuing guaranty may render 
the secondary obligation voidable with respect to extensions of credit subsequent to the 
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misrepresentation." Rest. 3d Sur, § 12, cmt i. See Sumitomo Bank o/California v. Iwasah, 447 
P.2d 956,958 (Cal. 1968) ("intentional or negligent misrepresentation or active suppression of 
the truth, will discharge the surety as to any subsequently incurred liability.") 
The Bank's non-disclosure of the existence of the continuing Guarantee is itself a 
material misrepresentation. Nondisclosure constitutes a material misrepresentation when the 
obligee: (a) knows facts unknown to the secondary obligor that materially increase the risk 
beyond that which the obligee has reason to believe the secondary obligor intends to assume; (b) 
has reason to believe that these facts are unknown to the secondary obligor; and (c) has a 
reasonable opportunity to communicate them to the secondary obligor. Rest. 3d Sur, § 12(3). 
This principle also appears in the law of tort, wherein "[0 Jne who fails to disclose to another a 
fact that he knows may justifiably induce the other to act or refrain from acting in a business 
transaction is subject to the same liability to the other as though he had represented the 
nonexistence of the matter that he has failed to disclose." Rest. 2d Torts § 551(1). A party to a 
business transaction has a duty to disclose "matters known to him that he kJ.'10WS to be necessary 
to prevent his partial or ambiguous statement of the facts from being misleading;" "subsequently 
acquired information that he knows will make untrue or misleading a previous representation 
that when made was true or believed to be so;" and "facts basic to the transaction, ifhe knows 
that the other is about to enter into it under a mistake as to them, and that the other, because of 
the relationship between them, the customs of the trade or other objective circumstances, would 
reasonably expect a disclosure of those facts." Rest. 2d Torts § 551(2)(b), (c), and (e). See Saint 
Alphonsus Reg'l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Krueger, 124 Idaho 501, 508, 861 P.2d 71, 78 (Ct. App. 1992) 
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(citing to the Rest. 2d Torts § 551(2); Tusch Enterprises v. Coffin, 113 Idaho 37, 42,740 P.2d 
1022,1027 (1987) (approving Rest. 2d Torts § 551); Everman Nat 'I Bankv. United States, 5 Cl. 
Ct. 118 (U.S. Cl. Ct. 1984) (holding that bank could not enforce guarantee when it failed to 
infonn guarantor of subsequently acquired infonnation that made untrue or misleading a 
previous representation). Further, when, as here, "the creditor, rather than debtor, solicits the 
surety ... the creditor has a greater duty of disclosure ... If the circumstances warrant disclosure 
by the creditor and the creditor fails to disclose, the surety will be discharged." Peoples Nat '/ 
Banko/Wash. v. Taylor, 711 P.2d 1021,1026 (Wash. App. 1985). 
Under the Restatement (Second) of Torts and Idaho Law, the Bank clearly had a duty to 
correct its misleading statements and those false statements upon which it knew the Van 
Engelens were relying. As noted and described in detail above, the Bank failed to disclose the 
existence of the Guarantee when it knew that the Van Engelens believed that no guarantee 
applied, and in fact fostered is misapprehension with its statements that no personal guarantee 
would be required for the Van Engelens' transactions with the Bank. No personal guarantee was 
included in the loan documents, and no mention was made of the existence of the continuing 
Guarantee, despite the fact that in the previous transactions with respect to NWD, the Van 
Engelens had been assured that no guarantee would be required. Based on its negotiations with 
the Van Engelens concerning guarantees, the Bank had reason to know that the Van Engelens 
were unaware of the continuing Guarantee. The Bank had many opportunities to disclose the 
existence of the continuing Guarantee and its applicability to the Six Loans, including during the 
lunch to solicit the Defendant's business, during the loan negotiations, and at closing, but it did 
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not do so. Enforcing the continuing Guarantee imposes liability on the Van Engelens that they 
did not intend to assume. Had the Bank disclosed the existence of the continuing Guarantee at 
the time, the Van Engelens would have had an opportunity to revoke that Guarantee prior to 
closing and effectuate their intent, known and communicated to the Bank, that the Six Loans 
would not be subject to a personal guarantee. See Sumitomo Bank o/California, 447 P.2d at 958 
(,,[TJhe creditor must not misrepresent or conceal facts so as to induce or permit the surety to 
enter or continue in the relationship in reliance on a false impression as to the nature of the 
risk.") 
The district court nevertheless held that this affirmative defense failed because the Van 
Engelens waived any disclosure of the guarantee and because any matters in connection with the 
Carriage Hill No.3 and 4 loans taken out by NWD were inapplicable to the Six Loans taken out 
by VED. (Tr. p. 76 L. 17 - p. 77 L. 7.) The errors in these positions have been addressed in 
detail above. The Bank's conduct with respect to the Carriage Hill No.3 and No. 4 loans is 
clearly relevant to the loans later taken by VED, and the Guarantee does not contain a waiver of 
disclosure of the existence of the Guarantee. The Bank's misrepresentations and material 
nondisclosure create genuine issues of material fact as to the enforceability of the alleged 
continuing Guarantee. Consequently, the Bank's Motion for Summary Judgment should have 
been denied. 
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6. There is a Genuine Issue of Material Fact as to Whether the Guarantee was 
Intended to Apply 
The Van Engelens contend that because the Guarantee was not referenced in any ofthe 
documents related to the Six Loans, (see R. Vol. II, p. 00342-00343, at p. 30 L. 12 - p. 34 L. 14 
and p. 36 L. 4-22), there is a genuine and material issue of fact as to whether the parties intended 
the Guarantee to extend to the Six Loans. The district court disagreed, holding that the 
Guarantee applied because it was a continuing guarantee, the language of which extends to all 
future obligations unless revoked. (Tr. p. 76 L. 5-16.) The district court's reasoning is called 
into question by the New York case Cadle Co. v. Newhouse, 300 A.D.2d 756 (N.Y.A.D. 2002). 
In that case, the guarantor guaranteed a $50,000 loan in 1989. The guarantee was a 
continuing guarantee for the borrower's liabilities to the lender "now or hereafter existing." The 
initial $50,000 loan was paid in full. In 1991, the borrower negotiated a second $2 million loan 
from the lender's successor. The borrower defaulted on that loan, and the lender sought payment 
from the guarantor under the 1989 continuing guarantee. The court held that there was a genuine 
and material issue of fact as to whether the 1989 continuing guarantee was intended to apply to 
the second loan when "[nJot one document in the record from [the lender] expressly links the 
1989 guaranty to the 1991 loan." Id. Such is the case here. Despite the existence ofa continuing 
guarantee, with language apparently extending to future transactions, no loan document relative 
to the Six Loans links the Guarantee to those loans. At the very least, this raises a genuine and 
material issue of fact as to whether the Guarantee was intended to apply to the Six Loans. The 
district court therefore erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the Bank. 
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7. Fraudulent Inducement 
The Van Engelens assert that because of the Bank's misrepresentations, they were 
fraudulently induced to cause VED to enter into the Six Loans. The elements of fraudulent 
inducement are: (1) a representation; (2) its falsity; (3) its materiality; (4) the speaker's 
kiiowledge of its falsity or ignorance of its truth; (5) his intent that it should be acted on by the 
person and in the manner reasonably contemplated; (6) the hearer's ignorance of its falsity; (7) 
his reliance on the truth; (8) his right to rely thereon; and (9) his consequent and proximate 
injury.s Aspiazu v. 1l1ortimer, 139 Idaho 548, 550, 82 P.3d 830, 832 (2003). A described in 
extensive detail in the sections above, the Bank knowingly made a false misrepresentation to the 
Van Engelens that no personal guarantee would be required for their loans with the Bank. These 
misrepresentations were made for the purpose of inducing the Van Engelens to cause their 
company to sign the loan documents, and the Van Engelens did so rely to their detriment. (R. 
VoL III, p. 00463-00464, at flfI6-11; R. VoL II, p. 00373, at p. 34 L 23 - p. 35 L 19; R. VoL 
III, p. 00463, at fl6; R. Vol. II, p. 00371, atp. 27 L 22 -po 28 L 16; R. VoL III, p. 00465, at" 
1 0-11.) As described above, the Bank had a duty to correct these misrepresentations of fact; as 
such, the Van Engelens had a right to rely upon such statements. 
S It is unclear whether an injury must be alleged when fraudulent inducement is advanced as an 
affInnative defense, rather than a claim or counterclaim. Regardless, the Van Engelens were 
damaged by causing VED to sign the loan documents. 
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The district court nevertheless held that this affinnative defense failed because the Bank's 
misrepresentations were representations as to future events which did not support a claim for 
fraudulent inducement. (Tr. p. i7 L. 8-18.) As the district court correctly noted, "An action for 
fraud or misrepresentation will not lie for statements of future events." Maroun v. Wyreless 
Systems, Inc., 141 Idaho 604, 615, 114 P.3d 974,985 (2005). See Ferro v. Soc yo/Saint Pius X 
143 Idaho 538,544,149 P.3d 813,819 (2006). However, the Bank's fraud in this case was not 
about a future event, such as whether L'1e Van Engelens would be required to sign a personal 
guarantee for future loans or whether previously signed personal guarantees would not be 
enforced for future loans. Rather, the Bank's misrepresentation was about the existence of 
personal guarantees which had been signed in the past. Furthennore, to the extent that any future 
representations were made, a "promise or statement that an act will be undertaken, however, is 
actionable, ifit is proven that the speaker made the promise without intending to keep it." Id. 
The evidence presented by the Van Engelens at least raises a genuine issue of material fact that 
the Bank did not intend to keep its promise that the various loans in this case would not be 
subject to a personal guarantee. As such, genuine issues of material fact preclude summary 
judgment on this affinnative defense. 6 
6 The district court also noted that there could be no "misrepresentation" as to future facts 
in the context of waiver. (Tr. p. 68 L. 5-7.) The doctrine of misrepresentation is separate from 
that of waiver; waiver does not require a misrepresentation. However, to the extent that this 
doctrine is even applicable to this or any other of the Van Engel ens , affinnative defenses, the 
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8. Genuine Issues of Material Fact Exist on the Van Engelens' Defense of as to 
Whether there are No Damages, Unjust Enrichment, Failure to Mitigate, and 
Double Recovery 
Even if the Guarantee is ultimately found to be enforceable against the Van Engelens, 
genuine issues of material fact exist on whether the Bank has actually suffered any damages, the 
amount of damages the Bank: has suffered, and whether the Bank: has failed to mitigate its 
damages. The Bank seeks the deficiency of $4,452,809.67 from the Van Engelens based on the 
alleged continuing Guarantee. While the bank: has sold some of the houses on the foreclosed 
property, (R. Vol. II, p. 00352, at p. 72 L. 5-23), the Bank has not constructed additional homes 
on the lots, (R. Vol. II, p. 00352-00353, at p. 72 L. 24 - p. 73 L. 3), and is simply holding the 
property in anticipation of further profits from the sale or development of the property in the 
future. (R. Vol. II, p. 00353, at p. 76 L. 1-19.) As a representative of the Bank: has 
acknowledged, it may be possible for the Bank: to recoup its losses by selling the property for 
more than the value it bid at the foreclosure sale. (R. Vol. II, p. 00330-00331, at p. 76 L. 25 - p. 
77 L. 15.) In fact, any sale of the property mitigates the Bank's damages. 
Contrary to the district court's holding otherwise, the Van Engelens are not attempting to 
invoke the protection ofIdaho's anti-deficiency statute, Idaho Code § 45-1512, which is 
inapplicable to guarantors. First Sec. Bank of Idaho v. Gaige, 115 Idaho 172, 174, 765 P.2d 683, 
685 (1988). These affirmative defenses assert that the Bank: would inappropriately receive a 
misrepresentation was about past events, and any future statements are actionable because there 
is evidence that the Bank: made the promise without intending to keep it. 
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windfall by collecting against the Van Engelens while still holding the valuable property. A 
party has an obligation to take such steps as would reasonably tend to minimize damages 
occasioned by breach of contract Casey v. Nampa and l'v1eridian Irr. Dist., 85 Idaho 299,305, 
379 P.2d 409,412 (1963). As this Court has said, "a plaintiff who is injured by actionable 
conduct of a defendant is ordinarily denied recovery for damages which could have been avoided 
by reasonable acts, including reasonable expenditures, after actionable conduct has taken 
place." Margaret H Wayne Trust, 123 Idaho at 261,846 P.2d at 912. As a personal guarantee is 
an agreement to pay the amount due if the borrower fails to pay, it is analogous to a liquidated 
damages clause wherein the parties agree in advance to the amount of damages in case of a 
breach. Such damages must, of course, bear a reasonable relationship to actual damages. See 
Graves v. Cupic, 75 Idaho 451, 456, 272 P.2d 1020, 1023 (1954). Under these circumstances, 
summary judgment should not have been granted because genuine issues of material fact exist on 
whether the Bank has actually suffered any damages or has failed to mitigate its damages. 
C. Statute of Frauds 
In addition to the matters discussed above, another key ruling that permeated the district 
court's opinion was its holding that any oral statements or misrepresentations by the Bank 
concerning the Guarantee were irrelevant because such "modifications" to the Guarantee had to 
be in writing in order to satisfy the Statute of Frauds, Idaho Code § 9-505(2). See First Interstate 
Bank of Idaho, N.A. v. West, 107 Idaho 851, 853, 693 P.2d 1053,1055 (1984). The Van 
Engelens do not contend that such statements by the Bank constituted "modifications" to the 
Guarantee, but rather that they support the Van Engelens' affIrmative defenses that the 
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Guarantee cannot be enforced because of the doctrines of waiver, equitable estoppel, quasi 
estoppel, fraud and/or breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Each of those 
defenses are either exceptions to the Statute of Frauds or are defenses to which the Statute of 
Frauds simply does not apply. As such, the district court's ruling otherwise was an error. 
1. USA Fertilizer is Inapposite 
The district COlli'1 premised its ruling that Statute of Frauds bars the Van Engelens' 
defenses on the court's incorrect reading of USA Fertilizer, Inc. v. Idaho First Nat. Bank, 120 
Idaho 271,815 P.2d 469 eet. App. 1991). The decision in USA Fertilizer, however, is inapposite 
as the facts and legal principles at issue in USA Fertilizer are completely different from the facts 
and defenses raised in the present case. First, the contract at issue in USA Fertilizer was not a 
personal guaranty, but instead was a commitment to USA Fertilizer by the bank in that case to 
loan money to USA Fertilizer's customer. !d. at 272-73,815 P.2d at 470-71. Second, and more 
importantly, the defenses raised by the Van Engelens in this case of waiver, equitable estoppel, 
quasi estoppel, unclean hands, fraud and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
were not at issue in USA Fertilizer. 
In USA Fertilizer, a farmer applied for an operating loan from a Bank. The fanner 
subsequently approached USA Fertilizer to obtain fertilizer for his farm. However, when USA 
Fertilizer contacted the Bank to confirm the fanner's fmancing, it learned that the loan had not 
yet been approved. Anticipating that the loan would be approved with the next month, the Bank 
orally committed to guarantee to lend up to $15,000 for the initial delivery of fertilizer to the 
farm. The Bank executed a standby letter of credit in favor to USA Fertilizer. The Bank also 
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issued a number ofletters to USA Fertilizer stating the Bank's cOl1h'TIitment to loan money to the 
farmer. USA Fertilizer was unsatisfied by the terms of the bank's commitment as stated in these 
letters. A USA Fertilizer representative therefore telephoned the Bank's loan officer to further 
discuss the terms of the Bank's commitment. The farmer ultimately defaulted on his obligations 
to USA Fertilizer, and USA Fertilizer sought relief from the Bank, asserting that the Bank had 
guaranteed payment for future the fertilizer deliveries. The Bank countered that it had 
guaranteed payment only as to the first shipment. In response, USA Fertilizer attempted to 
introduce evidence of the later telephone conversation. The Court noted that to the extent that 
USA Fertilizer was seeking to alter the original terms of the guarantee to lend, such an oral 
modification would be barred under the Statute of Frauds. Id. at 275,815 P.2d at 473. 
This holding is irrelevant to the present case. Here, the Van Engelens are not seeking to 
modify the personal guarantees. Instead, it is the Van Engelens' position that the Bank has 
waived its right, or is estopped from seeking, to enforce the continuing personal guarantees with 
respect to the loans that are at issue in this lawsuit. Nowhere in the USA Fertilizer decision did 
the Court of Appeals hold that the Statute of Frauds bars the Van Engelens' defenses of waiver, 
equitable estoppel, quasi estoppel, fraud and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing. The case simply does not apply to the facts and defenses at issue in the present case. 
2. The Statute of Frauds Does Not Bar the Van Engelens' Defenses 
a. The Van Engelens' Waiver Defense is not Barred by the Statute of 
Frauds 
The Statute of Frauds does not apply to the defense of waiver. This defense does not 
seek to modify as existing contract or create a new contract. Rather, waiver is a voluntary, 
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intentional relinquishment of a known right or advantage. Margaret H Wayne Trust, 123 Idaho 
at 256, 846 P.2d at 907. Thus, waiver is not a modification of contract; it is the giving up of the 
right to enforce the contract. Indep. Gas & Oil Co. v. TE. Smith Co., 51 Idaho 710, lOP .2d 317, 
322-23 (1932). As such, there is no case holding that the Statute of Frauds bars the defense of 
waiver. Indeed, the case Idaho Migrant Council, Inc. v. Nw. lvfut. Life Ins. Co., 110 Idaho 804, 
718 P.2d 1242 (Ct. App. 1986) specifically holds that the Statute of Frauds does not prevent a 
party from asserting that an agreement has been waived. In that case, a landlord and tenant 
entered into a lease agreement which contained a possession deadline. When the landlord failed 
to complete certain improvements to the building by that deadline, the tenant terminated the 
lease based on the breach of this possession clause. The landlord argued that because of certain 
oral statements made by the tenant, the tenant had impliedly waived the possession deadline 
contained in the lease. It was argued that the Statute of Frauds prevented this argument. The 
Court of Appeals disagreed and overturned the district court's order granting judgment on the 
pleadings to the tenant, holding: 
The Statute of Frauds, I.e. § 9-503, does not prevent [landlord] from claiming 
that [tenant] entered into a binding oral modification of the lease. "A defendant 
who is induced to rely on an oral agreement and who changes position to his own 
detriment cannot be defrauded by a plaintiff who interposes the Statute of Frauds 
to declare the agreement invalid." Roundy v. Waner, 98 Idaho 625, 628, 570 P.2d 
862, 865 (1977). 
Idaho Migrant Council, Inc., 110 Idaho 806-807, 718 P .2d at 1244-45. This is based on the 
rationale that "a court of equity will not permit the Statute of Frauds itself to become an agent of 
fraud." Roundy, 98 Idaho at 628, 570 P.2d at 865. 
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Other cases have also recognized that a party may waive the right to enforce the terms of 
a written agreement governed by the Statute of Frauds. See Riverside Dev. Co. v. Ritchie, 103 
Idaho 515,518-522,650 P.2d 657 (1982) (recognizing that a lessor may waive its right to 
enforce the terms of a lease, an agreement governed by the Statute of Frauds). Courts have even 
recognized that a party may waive the right to enforce a clause in an agreement requiring that all 
modifications be in writing. See e.g., Rules Sales & Serv., Inc. v. u.s. BankN.A., 133 Idaho 669, 
675-76,991 P.2d 857, 863-64 (Ct. App. 2000). Accordingly, the Statute of Frauds is not a bar to 
the Van Engelens' waiver defense, and therefore the district court erred in granting summary 
judgment on this basis. 
b. The Van Engelens' Equitable Estoppel Defense is not Barred by the 
Statute of Frauds 
As with all ofthe Van Engelens' defenses, their claim that the Bank is equitably estopped 
from asserting the existence of the Guarantee is not a modification of that Guarantee, but rather 
an assertion that it cannot be enforced. The Idaho Supreme Court has long recognized that 
equitable estoppel prevents a party from claiming that an oral promise is barred by the Statute of 
Frauds. See Ogden v. Griffith, 149 Idaho 489, 495, 236 P.3d 1249,1255 (2010); Boesiger v. 
Freer, 85 Idaho 551,563,381 P.2d 802,809 (1963); Treasure Valley Gastroenterology 
Specialists, FA. v. Woods, 135 Idaho 485, 490, 20 P.3d 21,26 (Ct. App. 2001); Cuevas v. 
Barraza, 146 Idaho 511, 198 P.3d 740 (Ct. App. 2008); Frantz v. Parke, 111 Idaho 1005, 729 
P.2d 1068 (Ct. App. 1986). While estoppel "does not vary the Statute of Frauds, [it does] bar the 
promisor from raising it as a defense." Frantz, 111 Idaho at 1010. Accordingly, the Statute of 
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Frauds is not a bar to the Van Engelens' equitable estoppel defense, and the district court 
therefore erred in granting SUllh"'11ary judgment on this basis. 
c. The Van Engelens' Quasi Estoppel Defense is not Barred by the 
Statute of Frauds. 
Quasi estoppel, like equitable estoppel, prevents the Statute of Frauds from being used as 
a defense to an oral promise. See Garner v. Bartschi, 139 Idaho 430, 437,80 P.3d 1031,1038 
(2003) (recognizing that quasi estoppel can be used to bar application of the Statute of Frauds, 
but holding that the conduct at issue did not satisfy the requirements of quasi estoppel). 
Accordingly, as with equitable estoppel, if the elements of quasi estoppel are satisfied, the 
Statute of Frauds does not bar the Van Engelens from relying on the Bank's pledge that the new 
loans would not be guaranteed. Accordingly, the Statute of Frauds is not a bar to this defense. 
d. The Van Engelens' FraudlMisrepresentation Defense is not Barred by 
the Statute of Frauds. 
As discussed above, the Bank's failure to disclose the existence of the continuing 
guarantee and failure to correct the Bank's misrepresentations that no guarantee would be 
required renders the guarantee voidable, unenforceable, and discharges the Van Engelens. "[A] 
misrepresentation occurring after the execution of a continuing guaranty may render the 
secondary obligation voidable with respect to extensions of credit subsequent to the 
misrepresentation." Rest. 3d Sur, § 12, cmt i.; see also Sumitomo Bank a/California, 447 P.2d at 
958. Because fraud renders the guaranty void, it is not a modification of the guarantee within the 
Statute of Frauds. Therefore, the Statute of Frauds has no application to the Van Engelens' fraud 
defense. 
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e. The Van Engelens' Good Faith and Fair Dealing Defense is Not 
Barred by the Statute of Frauds. 
The defense of violation of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing arises as 
to the terms of the existing guaranty or the loan agreements. Idaho Power Co v. Cogeneration, 
Inc., 134 Idaho 738, 750, 9 P.3d 1204,1216 (2000). It requires that parties perform in good faith 
the obligations imposed by the existing agreement. Record Steel & Const., Inc. v .. Martel Const., 
Inc., 129 Idaho 288,292,923 P.2d 995,999 eeL App. 1996). Because there is no modification 
to the terms of the agreement, but rather the enforcement ofa term implied into every agreement, 
Idaho First Nat. Bank, 121 Idaho at 287,824 P.2d at 862, the Statute of Frauds is inapplicable to 
this defense. 
f. The Van Engelens' Defense that the Guarantee was not Intended to 
Apply is Not Barred by the Statute of Frauds 
The Van Engelens' argument with respect to this defense is that because the Guarantee 
was not refereed in any of the documents related to the Six Loans, there is a genuine and material 
issue of fact as to whether the parties intended the Guarantee to extend to the Six Loans. As with 
waiver or estoppel, this is not an attempt to modify the terms the agreement, but rather an 
argument that because of the circumstances, the agreement is inapplicable or unenforceable. As 
such, the Statute of Frauds does not apply to this defense. 
g. The Van Engelens' Defense that they Were Fraudulently Induced to 
Cause VED to Enter into the Six Loans is Not Barred by the Statute of 
Frauds 
The defense of fraudulent inducement is not related to the interpretation or modification 
of the Guarantee, but whether the Bank committed fraud. The Statute of Frauds is inapplicable. 
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h. The Van Engelens' Defense that the Guarantee was not Intended to 
Apply is Not Barred by the Statute of Frauds 
This defense is not related to the interpretation or modification of the Guarantee, but the 
extent and existence of damages. As such, the Statute of Frauds is inapplicable. 
D. Consideration 
The district court also held that the Van Engelens' defenses failed because there was no 
evidence of consideration to support the "modification" of the Guarantee. (Tr. p. 59 L. 24 - 60 
L. 17.) As noted above, the affirmative defenses raised by the Van Engelens are not 
"modifications" to the Guarantee, which would require mutual consent and consideration, Brand 
S COlp. v. King, 102 Idaho 731, 733, 639 P.2d 429, 431 (1981), but rather reasons why the 
Guarantee is unenforceable because ofthe conduct of the Bank. Contrary to the district court's 
holding, such affirmative defenses do not require the existence of consideration. See Idaho Bank 
o/Commerce v. Chastain, 86 Idaho 146, 154,383 P.2d 849, 854 (1963) (waiver of bank's lien 
did not require consideration, because the waiver arose out of the bank's conduct); Seaport 
Citizens Bankv. Dippel, 112 Idaho 736, 739, 735 P.2d 1047,1050 (Ct. App. 1987) ("Where a 
waiver arises out of conduct and partakes of the nature of an estoppel, no consideration is 
necessary."); Andrus v. Irick, 87 Idaho 471,394 P.2d 304 (1964) (where party plead theories for 
rescission on the grounds of misrepresentation or lack of consideration, it was not necessary for 
the court to making fmdings upon the question of consideration when it had already made 
findings on the question of misrepresentation). As such, the district court's finding that there 
was no consideration does not bar the Van Engelens' defenses. 
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E. Attorney Fees 
If the Court finds in favor of the Van Engelens on tbis appeal, they \vill be the prevailing 
party on appeal and request costs and attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rules 40 and 41, 
and Idaho Code § 12-120(3). Under LA.R. 40, costs are generally allowed as a matter of course 
to the prevailing party. As to attorney fees, Idaho Code § 12-120(3) provides that: 
In any civil action to recover on an open account, account stated, note, bill, 
negotiable instrument, guaranty, or contract relating to the purchase or sale of 
goods, wares, merchandise, or services and in any commercial transaction unless 
otherwise provided by law, the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable 
attorney's fee to be set by the court, to be taxed and collected as costs. 
Id. As this case concerns a civil action to recover on a guaranty, the Van Engelens are entitled to 
attorney fees on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
As genuine issues of material fact exist on the Van Engelens' affirmative defenses, they 
ask tbis Court to reverse the order of summary judgment and judgment entered by the district 
court, and remand for further proceedings. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED tbis 21 st day of June, 2011. 
BA.l\1J)UCCI WOODARD SCHW ARTZMAL"J, PLLC 
~< l±2k 
Dara L. Parter 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellants 
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